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Abstract 
 
 
The paper addresses the interface of the recent antitrust reform of the European Union (EU) 
and the ongoing transformation of the power relations between shareholders and management 
as one of the key aspects of corporate governance. From the mid-1990s onwards, the EU 
competition regime has undergone a series of reforms. The 2004 antitrust reform, generally 
referred to as the ‘Modernization’, constitutes the focal point of analysis. It fundamentally 
changes the way in which anticompetitive conduct such as cartels and other restrictive 
business practices are prosecuted in the EU. With the replacement of Regulation 17 with 
Regulation 1/2003, the long-standing centralized public ex ante market control model was 
abolished and a decentralized ex post private enforcement regime became prevalent. Together 
with the enhanced emphasis on neo-classical micro-economic theories and econometric 
modeling in the assessment of anticompetitive behavior, the paper argues that the new regime 
introduces a more market-based approach of antitrust enforcement, which in addition also 
heralds a more shareholder value orientated market economy. Under the new regime, the pro-
activity of market actors to litigate observed anti-competitive behaviour before the EU or 
national courts increasingly determines whether or not EU antitrust laws are enforced. The 
paper demonstrates that the enhanced possibilities to litigate in antitrust matters open up a 
windows of opportunity for shareholders to increase their voice options vis-à-vis the 
management and to redistribute economic power into their favour.  
 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
An important flanking device of the contemporary transformation of corporate governance 
regulation is constituted by the developments of EU-level competition or antitrust policy.1 
Consisting of laws and regulations, competition policy generally pertains to the structure of 
market power and market integration. Situated at the heart of modern capitalist economies, it 
typically sets the conditions of market concentration and access, the scope of commercial 
freedom to conclude cooperative ventures with other companies, and more generally the 
distinction between the public and the private realm. Apart from the genuinely public market 
interventionist nature, competition policy can come in different shapes and serve a broad 
range of conflicting interests. Biased by the wider enforcement philosophies and competences 
of competition authorities, established practices and procedural rules, and most notably, 
interest group influence, it can both enable and constrain private market power, be more or 
less market-interventionist, more or less business-friendly or free market-orientated. 
Consequently, competition policy needs to be understood as ‘a product of the prevailing 
economic and political thinking of the times’ that is both constituted by and constitutive to the 
structural power relations in a political economy (Gavil et al. 2002: 69).  
 
It might not be immediately obvious, but there is an intimate connection between competition 
policy and corporate governance. The stringency in which competition laws are interpreted 
and enforced can have important repercussions on the patterns of ownership and corporate 
control. It can boost investor sentiments in procuring corporate equity, and influence strategic 
decision making with regard to mergers and acquisitions (M&A), financing capital, R&D 
investment, joint ventures and other forms of cooperative business contracts. The interface of 
competition law enforcement and corporate governance is manifold. A range of studies 
suggests linkages between announcements of anticipated mergers between listed companies 
and shareprice increases, filed antitrust lawsuits and negative shareprice reactions of 
defendant companies, or overall lower shareholder returns, and in the worst case even 
bankruptcy resulting from financial distress caused by litigation costs and liability payments 
(Bhagat et al. 1994; Bittlingmayer and Hazlett 2000; Alexander 1999; Bhagat et al. 1998; 
Bizjak and Coles 1995). Again other studies attempt to demonstrate how shareholder initiated 
antitrust class actions can provide a powerful disciplinary tool to achieve boardroom reform 
and enhance corporate performance and managerial efficiency (cf. Gande and Lewis 2005).  
 
  
Here the focal point of analysis is the wider significance of the transformation of antitrust 
regulation at the EU-level with respect to one key aspect within corporate governance, namely 
the power relations between shareholders and management. Regulatory reforms constitute 
important signposts for analyzing the Zeitgeist of competition policy as they mark the end of 
certain ideologically held beliefs and the consolidation of new ideas brought forth by 
dominant political forces in the time before the finalization. What is commonly termed ‘the 
Modernization’ comprises a package deal of both substantive and procedural reform measures 
that came into force on 1 May 2004 (European Commission 1999a). According to former 
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti it is tantamount to ‘a revolution in the way 
competition rules are enforced in the European Union’ (Monti 2004a). This paper highlights 
the combined impact of the newly introduced Regulation 1/2003, and the increased reliance 
on neoclassical microeconomics in the assessment of anticompetitive conduct. The new 
regulatory framework concerns the enforcement of EU cartel law and the prosecution of other 
forms of restrictive business behaviour as spelled out in Article 81 (TEC) (hereinafter antitrust 
law). It brought about a regulatory shift away from a centralized administrative ex ante public 
control model for commercial intercompany agreements towards a decentralized ex post 
private enforcement model, which refers to the ‘application of antitrust law in civil disputes 
before the courts’ and implies that private actors can litigate observed anticompetitive conduct 
before the courts as complementary to public antitrust enforcement (European Commission 
2005c: 4). The reform seeks in many ways to enhance the levels of private enforcement in the 
EU. The launch of a Green Paper proposes the introduction of new judical tools to render 
private actions more worthwile for claimants.  
 
The paper demonstrates that behind seemingly technocratic and detailed legal issues in the 
arcane field of antitrust control lurk important political questions regarding the distribution 
and concentration of economic power, not only between corporations, but also within the 
organizational structure of corporations. It attempts to reconstruct the interest constellation 
and the structural forces in the political economy that informed this process by paying close 
attention to the question of cui bono. This concomitantly helps to explain why it was 
conducted and how it relates to the power balance within corporate governance. It will be 
argued that the new regime of private enforcement plays into the hands of a more 
shareholdervalue-orientated market economy by opening up windows of opportunity for 
groups of shareholders to increase their voice options in the governance of corporations and to 
redistribute economic power in their favour. Moreover, a range of additional consequences 
  
are identified that come to the fore, such as the withdrawal of public market surveillance in an 
important field of competition control, and a growing market-reliance on the application of 
antitrust law. Reinforcing this trend is the institutional anchoring of the use of micro-
economic theories and ever more sophisticated econometric techniques to model 
anticompetitive conduct and market performance – a process that has been ongoing for a 
couple of years and that finds its consolidation in the reform measures. It will be argued that 
similar to the transformation of EU corporate governance regulation (see Van Apeldoorn and 
Horn in this volume), the reform of EU competition policy has been orientated towards a 
profound neoliberal restructuring – entailing a political predisposition towards more 
competition, more market-based regulatory approaches and a general inclination towards 
fostering corporate efficiency. 
  
The paper is organized as follows: the first section introduces the substance of the regulatory 
shift and locates its importance in the variety of capitalism debate by drawing on the Rhenish 
and the Anglo--Saxon category as focal points of departure. The following two sections 
interpret the reform against the backdrop of intersecting and mutually reinforcing features: the 
growing market-reliance in the application of antitrust law prompted by private enforcement, 
the consolidation of a process of ‘microeconomization’ and the combined impact of the latter. 
Section four zooms into the interest constellation that has driven the reform. Next to those 
directly involved in the reform process, that is, transnational business, the Commission and 
private practioners, the particular interests of a diffuse group of shareholders are highlighted, 
which alongside the antitrust reform lobbied for class action litigation and criminal sanctions 
as means to gain more corporate control. In conclusion the paper discusses the parallels of the 
substantive changes of corporate governance and antitrust law and underscores the 
contradictoriness of the interest motives of the different transnational forces that sought 
enhanced market-integrating and market-based regulatory solutions. 
 
 
THE REFORM OF EU ANTITRUST LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
The Administrative ex ante Notification Regime – A ‘Rhenish’ Peculiarity 
 
For more than 40 years the EU antitrust enforcement operated as a market-correcting regime 
following the rationale that the Commission’s DG Competition controls the market for 
  
anticompetitive conduct before it actually takes place. Regulation 17 from 1962 provided the 
interpretative and procedural framework regulating cartels and other restrictive business 
practices prohibited under Article 81 (TEC), as well as Article 82 (TEC) on the abuse of 
dominant positions. Its central component was an administrative ex ante notification regime 
according to which companies above a certain turnover threshold could notify envisaged 
intercompany agreements to the Commission.2 Each of these notifications was reviewed on 
the basis of whether the intended deal had the object or the effect of ‘prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market’ stipulated in Article 81(1). Entrusted 
with far-reaching executive powers, the Commission could either prohibit or allow a deal, ask 
for amendments, or grant exemptions. The latter could be done individually, on a case-by-
case basis or as block exemptions in the form of regulations specifying whole groups or 
sector-specific categories of agreements that were not considered anticompetitive, provided 
that the conditions set out in Article 81(3) were fulfilled. These conditions entailed that the 
agreement needed ‘to improve the production or distribution of goods, or then promote 
technical or economic progress that ultimately allows consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit’.  
 
Notifying a proposed transaction provided companies with a safe-harbour mechanism 
regarding the various forms of agreements that could potentially fall into the category of a 
cartel or restrictive business practice and ensured legal immunity from prosecution. Apart 
from crude price-fixing and market-sharing, the agreements under concern could take the 
form of production and R&D joint ventures, patent licensing, franchising contracts, strategic 
alliances in marketing and sales, distribution, information exchange and other cooperative 
activities, concerning either direct competitors (horizontal agreements) or companies involved 
in the different stages of the production, distribution, or marketing process (vertical 
agreements).  
  
The wider significance of an administrative ex ante notification regime for commercial 
intercompany agreements in particular, and for the way in which capitalism is organized more 
generally, often tends to be neglected. Commercial intercompany agreements and strategic 
alliances are a much more common business practice in modern market economies than the 
more easily observable concentration developments through M&As, which stand more 
frequently in the limelight of scholarly and media attention. The boundaries are often blurred: 
intercompany agreements can integrate major long-term business goals and include far-
  
reaching equity joint ventures, minority holdings and equity swaps (Ullrich 2003: 211-2). 
Similar to the wave of mergers during the 1990s, commercial agreements between companies 
rose considerably in number and often involved a cross-border dimension. Estimates for the 
OECD indicate an increase from 1050 in 1989 to 8660 in 2000, with a sudden jump to 4000 in 
1990 and a temporal peak of 9000 in 1995 (ibid: 210). The vast magnitude of such agreements 
reveals that the neoclassical notion of atomistic or perfect competition according to which 
discrete companies with clearly separable interests compete one-by-one is misleading. In the 
market reality the concentration of economic power through a web of ever more indiscernible 
linkages of agreements and strategic alliances seems prevailing, in particular in times of 
harsher competition resulting from an accelerated pace of ongoing liberalization of trade and 
financial markets as is the case since the 1990s. 
  
The administrative ex ante notification and exemption system of controlling commercial 
intercompany agreements constitutes a peculiar characteristic of the European antitrust model 
and reflects in many ways the central features of the Rhenish model of capitalist organization 
(cf. Albert 1993; Hall and Soskice 2001; Crouch and Streeck 1997). It was designed by 
leading representatives of the ordoliberal school, home-based at the Freiburg University in 
Germany, which enjoyed a long-standing influence on the institutional design of the EU 
antitrust regime, enforcement philosophies and attitudes towards anticompetitive conduct (cf. 
Gerber 1998).3 Central to the ordoliberal idea is that capitalism needs to be organized through 
the creation of a ‘thoroughly and continuously policed competition order’ (Budzinski 2003: 
15), in which many competitors compete on equal and fair terms. Franz Böhm (1980), one of 
the leading proponents, suggested to understand competition as a cultivated, rather than a 
naturally grown plant. The establishment of a proactive, powerful and governmentally 
independent institution of market surveillance protecting and controlling corporations from 
the harmful and destructive forces of the free market was considered essential. Only by means 
of a long-term orientated and balanced market interventionist strategy the ordoliberal proviso 
of ‘complete competition’ could be accomplished – a state of affairs in which no company has 
the power to coerce the conduct of another (Eucken in Gerber 1998: 245). From this 
macroeconomic vantage point, an enduring market structure with many equally powerful 
players was considered more important than the short-term market performance of individual 
companies.  
 
  
The ordoliberal legacy of an ideal market structure manifested itself in Article 82 prohibiting 
the abuse of a dominant position. However, apart from the current prosecution of Microsoft 
this law remained largely underenforced. Instead, the ordoliberal doctrine of many 
competitors was translated in the safeguarding of the diversity and entrepreneurial freedom of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which received special attention in EU antitrust 
practice.4 Moreover, the notion of strong public market intervention and supervision is 
reflected in the wide-ranging powers of the Commission in antitrust matters who can act as 
investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury in antitrust matters. The notification and exemption 
regime is a case in point, as it provided the Commission with much interpretative leeway. 
Primarily concerned with the long-term goal of the European economic integration project, 
the Commission tradionally applied antitrust laws to break up national market barriers in 
order to provide access to new market entrants and to stimulate the broader project of 
economic integration. Cross-border cooperation agreements were considered conducive to 
this goal. As exemption regulations expanded cumulatively, they came to include a broad 
range of agreements: a few vertical agreements, R&D-, specialization-, and standardization 
agreements, and technology transfer agreements, as well as specific agreements in the car 
distribution sector or the insurance sector (Cini and McGowan 1998: 98).  
 
The overwhelmingly administrative character of the notification and exemption regime 
provided the business community with a high degree of legal certainty and an avenue for 
lobbying for a laissez-faire treatment with regard to transactions that otherwise would have 
been forbidden. Occasionally exemption rules were even applied to counterbalance the 
competition focus with wider socio-economic and redistributive goals, such as the alleviation 
of employment problems of certain regions (Jarman--Williams 2001). Moreover, industry 
could anticipate on the benevolence of a public actor in the pursuit of long-term orientated 
restructuring measures in times of economic downfall, such as in the early 1970s when 
cutthroat economic competition was generally considered a danger for the economy and the 
social order. Declining industries (i.e. sugar, steel and shipbuilding) were allowed to deal with 
chronic overcapacities by jointly moderating production levels rather than competing each 
other to death and drastically reducing employment (Pollack 1998: 230; Fox 1997: 342). 
Therefore, due to permissive interpretations of the exemption rules, the toleration of the 
temporary establishment of so-called ‘crisis cartels’ has been no exception in Europe.  
 
  
The rather generous stance towards contractual agreements allowing companies to combine 
their resources and explore new profit opportunities contributed to the development of a 
variety of capitalism in which (hostile) takeovers were relatively less common (cf. De Jong 
1989; Hudson 2002) – arguably together with a range of other important ‘Rhenish’ features: 
the existence of major banks providing patient capital in form of long-term loans, and the 
lesser need for stock market quotations as a form of corporate finance rendering the 
acquisition of shares by potential bidders less of an option, as well as structural barriers for 
hostile takeovers in most corporate governance regimes, such as the issuance of priority 
shares with multiple controlling rights, and veto rights by banks, the state, or employee 
representatives (Cernat 2004: 153--5; Nölke 1999). In marked contrast to the systemic 
aversion to hostile takeovers in most European countries, the Anglo--Saxon type of capitalism 
(most notably that of the US and the UK), the per se prohibition and the criminal prosecution 
of price-fixing and market-sharing agreements, in other words ‘cartels’, encouraged 
companies to merge instead (Gaughan 2002: 23) – concomitantly alongside the predominance 
of stock market capitalization, the supremacy of shareholder interests and relatively few 
limitations for predatory raids in corporate governance regulation.  
  
 
The Abolition of the Notification Regime – A Step of Convergence Towards the US 
Model 
 
One of the central components of the 2004 EU antitrust reform package is the replacement of 
Regulation 17 with Regulation 1/2003, according to which notifications for Article 81-type 
agreements are no longer possible. In addition, the conditions for block exemptions have been 
expanded, and the whole of Article 81 and 82 declared directly applicable ‘if trade between 
the Member States is affected’.5 The latter implies that the EU antitrust enforcement regime 
has become decentralized: national competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts have 
to apply EU antitrust laws for commercial transactions of Community-dimension in parallel to 
their own distinct competition laws. The abolition of this long-standing tradition of 
administrative and supervisory market control for commercial intercompany agreements 
means that companies cannot rely anymore on the Commission’s official decision prior to 
concluding an agreement, nor can they seek individual exemption. This reflects a 
retrenchment of the Commission and marks the introduction of a system of private 
enforcement. With the removal of a public warranty to proceed with a transaction, companies 
  
have to assess themselves whether a particular cooperative agreement breaches EU antitrust 
law, or whether it falls under the revised system of block exemptions for Article 81(3). It 
entails further that companies are increasingly exposed to the risk of being litigated by other 
market actors, a jeopardy that so far has constituted a relatively alien feature in EU antitrust 
control. The reform seeks in many ways to enhance the levels of private enforcement, which 
reflects a major step of convergence towards the Anglo--Saxon antitrust model, in particular 
towards that of the US. The federal antitrust authorities, the Department of Justice (DoJ) and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), never played a similar comforting role as the 
Commission, nor was there an equivalent of the EU notification regime for commercial 
agreements in the US. Instead, under the US model of ex post private enforcement hitherto 
more than 90 per cent of all formal antitrust actions are brought to the courts by private 
litigators (James 1999; Kemper 2004: 9; Wils 2003: 477).6 Although private entities have 
always played an important role in the enforcement of EU antitrust law – the Commission 
received on average more than 100 private complaints per year (Paulis and Smijter 2005: 12) 
– private litigation as complementary to public enforcement has never become a widely 
applied practice: in less than five per cent of the cases did private litigators take the initiative 
to invoke a claim at the European courts (Kemper 2004: 9).  
 
The ex ante notification regime provided little ground for private actors to bring legal actions 
to the courts: once the Commission cleared a case or granted exemption, companies enjoyed 
legal immunity from further prosecution, leaving for claimants only the option of challenging 
the Commission’s decision before the European courts. Positing a case at the Commission’s 
desk was far more appealing as most civil law schemes plaintiffs needed to collect the 
relevant evidence and prove that a certain business conduct infringed the law, as well as cover 
the alleged costs of suing (Pirrung 2004: 97). In addition, most of the legal features that make 
it attractive to initiate legal proceedings against corporations in the US were absent in the EU 
system: successful plaintiffs were not awarded three times the damage suffered on top of the 
costs of suing, nor was there a possibility for class actions in which several plaintiffs group 
together and sue collectively. Moreover, ‘no-win-no-fee’ or contingency fees offered by most 
US law companies – according to which professional litigators representing the plaintiffs in 
court make their profit dependent on the monetary award – are prohibited in most European 
legal systems. Hence, the absence of these judicial tools renders the legal landscape of the EU 
a rather hostile environment for private antitrust action, which is why in the European setting 
  
a claimant’s culture with exorbitant compensation payments, like that of the US, is a rather 
alien feature. 
  
Even though the 2004 reform does not directly touch upon further legal modifications, the 
current discussion on a range of legal instruments for private plaintiffs is likely to render the 
reform a stepping-stone in a much broader process of enhanced convergence towards the US 
model of private enforcement. In particular the creation of stronger incentives for private 
litigation has achieved high agenda status. Commissioner Kroes is quite overt in this respect: 
[`…] the comprehensive enforcement of the competition rules is not yet complete – not 
enough use is made of the courts.’ (Kroes 2005c) In December 2005 the Commission 
presented its ideas on how to 'increase the scope for private enforcement’ in a Green Paper 
promoting the introduction of ‘Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ 
(European Commission 2005c). As a point of departure, the current situation of damage 
claims for antitrust infringements in the EU-25 was noted to present a picture of ‘total 
underdevelopment’ and ‘astonishing diversity’ (ibid). Whether or not a facilitated damage 
relief system should be introduced at all did not form part of the Commission’s 36 options 
specifying its implementation. Once a system of damage relief is introduced, the Commission 
expects private parties to go much further in bringing actions to the courts than competition 
authorities (Monti 2004b). Moreover, the gradual raise in private law suits and facilitated 
court access is expected to increase the overall level of enforcement and render it at least ‘as 
effective as in the US, if not more so’ (Philip Lowe cited in Dombey 2004). The next section 
highlights why private enforcement unequivocally stimulates a more market-based antitrust 
regime.  
  
 
TOWARDS A MORE MARKET-BASED REGIME 
 
With the emphasis on private enforcement the centre of gravity shifted from the 
Commission’s desk to the proactivity of market participants. Companies are not only expected 
to watch over themselves but also their competitors, distributors and suppliers and to bring 
antitrust breaches to the courts. The same is expected from consumers, employees and other 
possible private litigants. Even though competition authorities continue to be entitled to 
intervene in private market conduct, the system has become more market-based: it attempts to 
evoke a situation of mutual control by market actors, and henceforth a deterrent to 
  
anticompetitive behaviour: the fear of litigation should prevent companies to engage in 
unlawful agreements and ensure a better compliance with antitrust laws.  
 
An essential effect of the new regime is that the retrenchment of a public authority creates a 
whole new avenue for professional services firms specialized in antitrust regulation, also 
called law companies, to assist other companies in the decision whether a planned business 
transaction produces anticompetitive effects, or whether it belongs into the category of block 
exemptions. Although legal experts have played already significant counselling roles under 
the notification procedure, with the introduction of private enforcement the demand-side for 
judicial advocacy in antitrust matters increases, in particular as most companies do not 
possess in-house expertise on complex antitrust matters. Professional service companies find 
a new market for a whole range of products, such as tailor-made compliance programs, 
economic analyses on market structures and market shares as a basis for assessment, targeted 
lobbying activities at the EU and the national regulatory institutions, and in case of litigation, 
corporate lawyers representing their clients at the courts. Whereas the Commission’s decision 
provided companies with a legal check free of charge, under the new regime specialized legal 
advice needs to be purchased on the market similar to any other commodity, reflecting a case 
in point of an overall ‘deepening commodification’, which started in the late 1970s and is 
marked by ‘expanding market relations and possibilities for private profit pursuit into ever 
further spheres and dimensions of human activity and existence’ (Overbeek 2004a: 4). This 
development is likely to be reinforced by the ongoing trend towards more ‘microeconomics’ 
in antitrust enforcement, which will be addressed in the next section.  
  
 
 THE ‘MICROECONOMIZATION’ OF EU ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
 
The 2004 reform is concomitant to a steady trend towards the use of ever more sophisticated 
neoclassical economic principles and econometric evidence in the assessment of 
anticompetitive conduct. The sheer number of economists and financial analysts that were 
employed to assist the legal experts in the EU has been growing in the past few years. 
Arguably it should not surprise that a regulatory field located at the interface of law and 
economics attracts personnel with an interdisciplinary academic background, including legal 
experts and lawyers, paralegals, economists, industry specialists and accountants and the like. 
Traditionally more lawyers and legal experts than economists have occupied the field of 
  
antitrust enforcement in the EU (Cini and McGowan 1998: 50). Correspondingly, judicial 
interpretations of anticompetitive conduct were predominant. Again, this marks a strong 
contrast to the US, where economic principles and the collection of quantitative econometric 
data in the investigation phase forms the epitome of antitrust decision making (Scheffman and 
Coleman 2001, Katz 2004). 
 
From the from the 1960s onwards, generations of US antitrust practioners were influenced by 
the maxims and analytical concepts of the Chicago School of Law and Economics, which 
emerged as a Monetarist response to Keynesianism and celebrated its heyday under the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s (cf. Gerber 1998, Budzinski 2003). Adherents of the 
Chicago School propagated neoliberal deregulation and further liberalization of markets by 
drawing on the neoclassical economic assumption of self-regulating markets, according to 
which the free interplay of market mechanisms results in an optimal and effective resource 
allocation, and ultimately benefits consumers with lower prices.7 In this view, any regulatory 
steering of the market should be the exception and antitrust law enforcement restricted to 
safeguarding price competition and efficiency improvements at the company level. In the 
Reagan era, mergers were no longer contested. Market concentration was assumed to create a 
situation of economies of scale, and therefore greater allocative and productive efficiency, and 
thus, lower prices for consumers – a perspective that ushered in a ‘hands-off’ approach at the 
federal level (Motta 2004: 4). When some of the leading exponents of the Chicago School 
were elected as judges at the US Supreme Court and when the Chicago Trainee Program 
‘educated’ about half of the federal judges in antitrust law enforcement under Reagan’s 
presidency, Chicagoan theorems penetrated antitrust jurisprudence and so became a deeply 
engrained philosophy (Schmidt and Rittaler 1986: 11--2). Although so-called Post-Chicago 
scholars eventually took a slightly more interventionist stance, the yardsticks of narrow 
efficiency concerns and the focus on price reductions as a conceptual benchmark for 
consumer welfare maximisation remain unchallenged until today. This is likely to be fortified 
by the re-employment of the Chicago-brigade under the presidency of George W. Bush.8 Over 
time the Chicagoan heritage resulted in highly sophisticated economic modelling to measure 
market efficiency and consumer welfare based on neoclassical economic theories, supported 
by econometric analyses and specific algorithms for the definition of markets and market 
boundaries and rational-choice game theories as a foundation for detecting rent-seeking cartel 
behaviour (Fox 1997: 340). Moreover, the use of price theories and price modelling as a 
central reference point for determining anticompetitive conduct quintessentially gives 
  
precedence to a microeconomic perspective and to short-termism: the focus on prices limits 
the perspective to single company behaviour in relation to consumers at a particular point in 
time and disregards macroeconomic issues like market power concentration and market 
structure.  
  
 
Narrowing the Gap: From Freiburg to Chicago 
 
Currently about half of the qualified officials working at the Commission’s DG Competition 
have an academic degree in economics (Röller and Friederiszick 2005). Under the legacy of 
former Commissioner Mario Monti, an economist himself, the economic sophistication of 
antitrust law enforcement received a major boost. Also his successor Neelie Kroes repeatedly 
announced that further reforms facilitating high-quality economic analyses will also be at the 
top of her agenda (Kroes 2005a, 2005b). As one of the chief architects behind the 2004 
‘modernization’, Monti’s role was pivotal in reorganizing the professional nature of the 
Commission’s competition department. As Monti himself noted: ‘One of my main objectives 
upon taking office […] has been to increase the emphasis on sound economics in the 
application of the EC antitrust rules, in particular to those concerning different types of 
agreements between companies […]’ (Monti 2001). Similar to the US model, a post called the 
‘Chief Competition Economist’ was established, which had the mission to scrutinize the 
Commission’s antitrust investigations with a ‘fresh pair of eyes’ and ‘independent economic 
viewpoints’ (Monti 2002). Accompanied by an entourage of experienced economists called 
the Economic Advisory Group, the Chief Economist guides the work of the regular staff of 
lawyers and other economists on a case-by-case basis in all fields of competition control, i.e., 
mergers, antitrust and state-aid cases and advises on the future development of competition 
policy (Röller 2005: 6).  
 
Apart from the numerical transformation of competition officers with a background in 
economics, a range of indicators lay bare that the kind of competition economics that made its 
entry is grounded in microeconomics, analytically premised on methodological individualism, 
and home-based in the neoliberal free market ideology. The new creed of economists 
maintains strong transatlantic links indicating that the substance of economic theories that has 
become prevailing in EU enforcement practice is likely to be streamlined with that dominant 
in the US. Bilateral meetings where ‘past case work’ and ‘economic methodology’ is 
  
discussed with economists working at the FTC and the DoJ take place on a regular basis 
(Röller 2005: 6). In this vein it seems no coincidence that Professor Lars-hendrik Röller, who 
was appointed Chief Competition Economist in July 2003, was educated in competition 
economics in the US.  
 
Although differences in the legal instruments remain, the Commission is increasingly using 
‘the same micro-economic analytical tools as the US’ (Schaub 2002: 3). Monti heralded the 
silent process of convergence as the ‘most important success story in the transatlantic 
relationship’ and argued that EU competition policy is now clearly grounded in ‘sound 
microeconomics’ (Monti 2004b). He observed:  
 
[…] (w)e share a common fundamental vision of the role and limitations of public 
intervention. […] We are both grappling with the same evolving economic realities 
and are both exposed to the same evolution in economic thinking. (ibid)9  
 
This ‘common fundamental vision’ entails that the ultimate purpose of public intervention 
into the marketplace is to ensure that competitive prices are not harmed. The enhanced 
emphasis on prices together with the declaration of consumer welfare as the predominant task 
of competition control, indicates that the macroeconomic orientated vision inspired by 
ordoliberal economic thinking is vanishing in one of its last strongholds. This has a profound 
impact on the scope and nature of antitrust control in a regime of private enforcement and the 
overall corporate climate in the EU as the next section will show. 
 
 
‘Microeconomisation’ in a System of Private Enforcement 
 
Economic principles and econometric analyses are predicated upon ideologically-held beliefs 
on how economic reality functions. Recalling that 'theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose' (Cox 1981: 128) reminds us that there is no such thing as neutral theory. The 
reduction of real-world complexity into econometric modelling and analyses, the subsequent 
operationalisation and assessment of empirical data has as a consequence that the parameters 
excluded, so-called exogenous variables, simply remain unnoticed in the decision making. 
Mathematical economics merely measures what it can measure. If price calculations to 
indicate consumer welfare are prioritized, the welfare of employees and employment aspects, 
  
the restructuring of certain industries in times of economic downfall, or the protection of the 
environment are less likely to be considered as decisive factors in the final decision making. 
Moreover, there is no such thing as testing against what Joseph Schumpeter (1942) called ‘the 
cold metal of economic theory’. Assessing a particular business transaction as anticompetitive 
conduct is always based on a speculative judgment of collected evidence, which derives from 
paradigmatic beliefs about market realities.  
 
Private enforcement in a decentralized enforcement regime is likely to bring the speculative 
character of antitrust enforcement to the fore. In the decentralized enforcement regime of the 
EU, no less than 26 jurisdictions with thousands of tribunals will have to set the yardsticks 
and evaluate the soundness of technically complex empirical material used in accusations and 
court defences. In the absence of specialized competition courts, ‘ordinary’ judges will award 
damage compensation and impose fines, and in Member States where competition law 
infringements are prosecuted under criminal law, even imprison CEOs for their unlawful 
activities. The chances for deviant interpretations are very high and the legal forum-shopping 
for claimants may become common. As competition laws often tend to be formulated in loose 
and imprecise terms, due process of law according to established rules and principles is 
difficult to maintain. The frequency of so-called ‘borderline’ cases constitutes part of the 
reason why the devolution of antitrust enforcement competences to national courts has led to 
many controversies.10  
 
In combination with enhanced possibilities of private enforcement, the ‘microeconomization’ 
of competition law enforcement becomes all-pervasive. Future claimants may relate upon 
legal precedents, which has the potential effect that the growing body of judge-made case law 
looks in certain economic data-gathering methods as the standard for decision making. In 
sum: whereas before a public authority could balance the decision making in antitrust matters 
according to broader political macroeconomic goals, individual private claimants by 
definition are more likely to be driven by self-interest when invoking a claim. Similarly, 
national judges proceed on a case-by-case basis without taking into account the wider political 
economy. In combination with the trend towards more microeconomics, the new regime is 
likely to prelude a political bias towards narrower and more short-term conceptions of 
competition. This then, brings us to the question of who, given this content, benefits from the 
new antitrust regime, and to what extent those who have an interest also have been driving the 
reform.  
  
 
 CUI BONO? THE DRIVING FORCES AND THEIR AGENDAS  
 
The Mixed Emotions of ‘Corporate Europe’ 
 
The ex ante notification regime did not cause widespread public dissatisfaction that would 
explain why the reform was conducted. On theoretical grounds one could expect companies 
subject to the reform, including management boards and shareholders alike, to be strong 
proponents of the reform: with the removal of a burdensome administrative straightjacket, the 
leeway to make use of the freedom of contract and to engage in all types of commercial 
agreements without being immediately controlled by the Commission’s interventionist arm. 
Indeed, the business community represented at the EU-level, the Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE), and the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERT), were to some extent in favour of ‘modernizing’ the application of the EC 
antitrust rules ( Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe 1995, 2001, 
2002). CEOs in particular repeatedly criticized the Commission’s farreaching powers that 
themselves were not subject to judicial control (European Round Table of Industrialists  2001: 
3). Cumbersome, in-depth antitrust reviews in which the Commission needs to be persuaded 
that a deal should go through on the basis of elaborate rock-hard economic data and legal 
analyses is neither in the interest of executive boards nor shareholders.  
 
TNCs are genuinely interested in lifting regulatory barriers that hamper the free flow of 
capital accummulation, or what in Eurojargon euphemistically came to be translated as 
‘creating a level playing field’. Rigid reviews of cross-border intercompany agreements 
involving several jurisdictions increase transaction costs and the probability of conflicting 
results. Therefore, the regulatory system offering the most favourable structure tends to be 
preferred. In this vein, the ERT encouraged the Commission to embody a more economics-
based interpretation of antitrust law and ‘to emulate the US more fully’ in this respect, in 
particular with regard to measuring efficiency improvements in antitrust analyses (European 
Round Table of Industrialists 2002). A range of reasons account for the strong preference for 
the US model. In the 1990s, about half of all strategic partnerships had a transatlantic 
dimension, whereas only a quarter concerned pure intraeuropean deals (Ullrich 2003: 210--1). 
Moreover, US antitrust officials and business representatives repeatedly criticized the 
Commission’s weak commitment to sound economic evidence in its decision making and 
  
culminated after a series of divergent rulings by the Commission in high-profile cases 
between US companies.11 Severe criticism came also from the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which overruled three high-profile decisions taken 
by the DG Competition on the grounds that the economic evidence that underpinned the 
prohibitions was deemed insufficient and its economic logic not convincing (i.e. Airtours--
First Choice in 1999, Schneider--Legrand and Tetra Laval--Sidel in 2002). After these 
embarrassing court defeats, the hiring of economists and the convergence towards US-style 
economic thinking received a major boost. Director-general Philip Lowe, an economist 
himself, concluded that the reliance on economic foundations in competition matters brings 
‘comfort on the robustness of the decisions’ (Lowe 2003). A large part of this ‘comfort’, 
however, can be ascribed to the fact that since 2002 most of the transactions have been 
cleared anyway.  
 
The use of microeconomics in antitrust matters is also grounded in the vested interest of 
transnational corporations to keep certain stakeholders away from the negotiating table. The 
ERT quite overtly argued that the greater involvement of groups like consumers and 
employees ‘risks diverting the attention from the competition focus of the Commission’s 
analysis and increasing both uncertainty and delay’ (European Round Table of Industrialists  
2001: 4). With the focus on ‘competition only’ building upon short-term orientated 
econometric evidence more diffuse societal interest are unlikely to be expressed. Additionally, 
it may bestow a regime an arm’s length basis and provide managers with an avenue for less 
stringent enforcement. Concepts such as ‘dynamic efficiency improvements’ leave ample 
room for gerrymandering the decision making in the wished-for direction. Already prior 
definitions on ‘relevant product markets’ or delimitation of one product vis-à-vis another can 
be used for ‘moulding’ evidence to support a particular claim. Moreover, as one commentator 
has argued, estimations of future competitve impacts assessed on the basis of defined 
confidence intervals are tantamount to an ‘intuitive judgment in deciding whether a test is 
passed or not’ (Dobbs 2002: 3).  
 
Nevertheless, the support of ‘Corporate Europe’ is not straightforward. On the contrary, 
emotions are mixed and certain elements of the reform have been fiercely criticized. The 
administratively burdensome, but secure way of the notification regime has had its proponents 
especially among UNICE, which comprises the whole range of European companies 
including SMEs. With respect to the regime change it argued that ‘the complexity of the rules 
  
requires extensive expert advice’ and ‘substantial management time’ (Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederation of Europe 1999, 2001). This contrast to the argumenation of the 
Commissioner Monti justifying the reform by saying that the Commission’s role, as an 
antitrust enforcer, was not to give comfort, and that ‘after forty years of experience the 
application of European competition law should be sufficiently clear to business’ (Monti 
2004a). Elsewhere he compared the notification procedure to parking a car in a town: ‘citizens 
must know where to park a car and shouldn’t have to go to the police station to check first’ 
(ibid 2004b). The fact that antitrust law enforcement is far more complex than Monti’s car 
parking allegory suggests forms part of the discontent of the business community, in 
particular as the fines imposed on cartel cases exceed those of traffic offences. Also among 
the selected group of transnational companies (TNCs) reprsented in the ERT the formal safe 
harbour regime constituted a much cherished good – provided that ‘speedy and 
straightforward processing’ was guaranteed (European Round Table of Industrialists 2002). 
Judicial advocacy by corporate lawyers cannot provide for the wished-for legal certainty in a 
competitive environment of ever-shorter amortisation periods of new technology products – 
so the argument. Generous interpretations on corporate alliances such as investment-sharing, 
R&D partnerships and the like have always been welcomed (ibid).  
 
In marked contrast to enthusiasm for a more microeconomics-based approach, the novel risk 
of litigation and the exposure to compensation payments alarmed the management boards of 
companies organized in the UNICE and ERT alike. The reason seems obvious: potential fines, 
damage compensation payments to private claimants and the costs of defending can cause 
significant reductions in a company’s wealth, and even be detrimental (cf. Bizjak and Coles 
1995). Although the 2004 antitrust reform does not immediately mean the advent of an US-
style litigation culture, CEOs from the European business community have been very much 
aware of this scenario. Moreover, the new regime of decentralised private enforcement, which 
allows private litigants to bring breaches of EU antitrust law to national courts, has been 
deemed to ‘accentuate inconsistency, a lack of transparency and unpredictability’ (cf. Union 
of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe 1999, European Round Table of 
Industrialists 2002). In a range of position papers during the preparatory stages of the reform, 
business organizations sought to limit the exposure to law suits by advocating inbuilt legal 
safety measures in the form of ex ante reasoned opinions by competition authorities and 
national jurisdictions. The issuance of such advices would come close to the reintroduction of 
the notification regime. In response, the Commission promised merely the occasional 
  
provision of general ‘guidance letters’ published on its web site. Only in ‘genuine cases of 
uncertainty’, it will grant case-specific informal guidance (cf. Recital 38 of Regulation 
1/2003). This loosely defined assent by the Commission has been very much regretted by 
business, which pleaded for guidance, in particular in cases of commercial agreements that 
‘are ancillary to, or involve a financial risk, capital investment, or an effect on shareholder 
value’ ( Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe 2001: 5, European 
Round Table of Industrialists 2002). The latter is important in the context of the current 
transformation of corporate governance regulations. The next section addresses private 
antitrust enforcement in terms of its potential impact on the corporate power balance of 
management vis-à-vis shareholders. 
 
 
Enhanced Antitrust Litigation to Pursue Corporate Governance Goals? 
 
Commissioner Kroes presents the enhanced antitrust litigation possibilities ‘as a right for 
consumers and individual businesses in Europe who have lost out as a result of the 
anticompetitive behaviour of others’ (Kroes 2006). The generalization that society is 
constituted by either consumers or competitors that might have an interest in rectifying 
abusive corporate behaviour downplays the existence of other stakeholders, such as labour 
and environmentalists. Moreover, diffuse groups such as labour, consumers and individual 
businesses, face high administrative costs to organize claims against corporate fraud. Instead, 
another category of plaintiffs is more likely to make use of the facilitated antitrust litigation 
possibilities, namely shareholders, in particular institutional investors and hedge funds 
prioritsing short-term profits. As the reform explicitly hinges upon enhanced private antitrust 
litigation, so-called ‘voice options’ for shareholders increase (cf. Hirschman 1970). At a first 
glance, the reform and shareholder activism in antitrust litigation may not appear to be 
related. However, apart from accounting manipulation or securities fraud in cases of 
inaccurate disclosure of information, a wide range of other events can account for legal 
actions induced by shareholders. This include breaches of contract, patent infringements, 
product failures, bankruptcy issues, slander, marketing, distribution and franchise disputes 
and notably, also antitrust violations (cf. Bizjak and Coles 1995, Kahan and Rock 2006). As a 
rule of thumb, the more regulatory fields become subject to private enforcement, the more 
rent-seeking private investor groups are provided with new windows of opportunity to alter 
the corporate power balance in their favour and to pursue corporate governance goals. 
  
Challenging mismanagment and fraudulent behaviour of CEOs at the courts may serve as a 
means for vetoing inauspicious decisions by CEOs and for intervening into decision making 
in cases of sharevalue loss, altering the composition of the management, allocating monetary 
awards compensating for past harmful board actions or conducting hostile take-over bids by 
litigating target companies. Shareholder activism in antitrust matters may expose management 
boards to new risks regarding long-term investment strategies and in the worst case 
bankruptcy, which makes an easy prey for hostile take-overs. The institutional anchoring of 
short-term performance indicators in antitrust assessments provides additional ground for 
litigation. Already the mere threat of suing may discipline company boards to deliver higher 
returns on investment in the short-run. 
    
A number of shareholder rights organisations and institutional investors, such as public 
pension funds, have long urged national governments in Europe to introduce a range of legal 
modifications in the litigation procedures, such as class actions and criminal sanctions (cf. 
Hollinger 2005, Allen 2005, Sherwood and Tait 2005). Quests for more ‘market justice’ have 
in particular intensified with recent corporate scandals in the accounting sector, such as in the 
case of Enron, Parmalat and Ahold, or in the turmoil of ABN AMRO’s acquisition of 
controlling stakes in Banca Antonveneta. Investor plaintiffs in Europe have a stake in getting 
the same leveraging powers as investors in the US (cf. Allen 2005). However, shareholders 
neither speak with one voice, nor is there a clear-cut interest coalition of shareholders to 
identify. Different categories of shareholders have different interests: whereas, for instance, 
hedge funds, may follow an aggressive strategy of short-term profit maximization, 
(investment) banks, insurance companies and (certain) pension funds may be more inclined to 
more secure long-term investment. Moreover, the interests of the shareholders of one 
company are not equivalent to those of another company. The reason seems obvious. The 
exposure of a company to high damage compensation payments and in the worst-case even 
bankruptcy or hostile takeovers eventually renders economic life more precarious for all 
stakeholders involved, including shareholders.  
 
In view of the current proposals for facilitated shareholder litigation in the EU Member States, 
one is tempted to conclude that those shareholder demands opting for the Anglo--Saxon 
litigation practice find themselves on the winning side: while Sweden and the UK have 
already introduced the possibility for class action lawsuits in general, Germany specifically 
included a range of measures that facilitate private actions into its 7th amendment of 
  
competition law. As a part of the attempt to make Germany a global financial centre with ‘a 
stock market as a viable avenue for investment’, two government proposals have been 
launched on 14 March including a bill on shareholder class actions and a bill on shareholder 
derivative lawsuits (Kamar 2005: 17--18). Similarly, in Italy shareholder rights have been 
strengthened and made conceptually reminiscent of US corporate legislation to attract US 
investors (ibid: 22). Also in Finland, the Netherlands and France, the issue of facilitated 
shareholder litigation has reached agenda status. For instance in France President Chirac has 
recently instructed his government to put forward initiatives for the introduction of class 
actions against abusive market practices – an incremental move which fits into the political 
landscape of the competition law overhaul. 
 
 
Professional Service Companies – The Beneficiaries of the Reform?  
 
Private antitrust practioners working at professional services companies, commonly termed 
law companies, are often underrated as a political force in antitrust matters (cf. the 
contribution to this volume by Nölke and Perry on the role of coordination service firms, of 
which law firms may be considered an example). They form part of the epistemic community 
surrounding the DG Competition, which is marked by a dense fabric of professional linkages: 
private practioners work on the same antitrust cases as public officials, although representing 
antagonistic positions when defending a client, and they gather at the same conferences. 
Hence, they are socialized to speak, write and think about antitrust technicalities in the same 
idiosyncratic way (Slaughter 2004: 253). Moreover, they provide for a source of staff 
recruitment and inspiration with regard to the future development of competition policy.  
 
Professional service companies will always profit from private antitrust enforcement as it 
increases the demand for judicial advocacy. The contemporary legal services landscape in the 
EU demonstrates that the phenomenon of law companies with a specialization in antitrust 
issues is no longer a phenomenon restricted to the Anglo--Saxon type of capitalism. Countless 
law companies with ever expanding numbers of lawyers and economists have established 
offices throughout Europe and in particular in Brussels – all tuned to profit from the booming 
market of antitrust counselling in Europe. Not to be underestimated is the sheer number of 
law companies originating from across the Atlantic. As an US antitrust lawyer observed: 
‘Some firms think Brussels will be the next Washington.’ (cited in Henning 2003).12 
  
 
As regular and influential guests in the preparatory stages of the reform, private law 
companies displayed their expertise in the form of advisory reports to Commission officials: 
their share of official comments on the ‘White Paper on the Modernisation’ and on the 2005 
Green Paper outnumbered that of business and labour organisations, or national competition 
authorities (NCAs) (European Commission 2006). Again, a significant share of commentators 
originated from the US, which is illustrative of a strong interest from across the Atlantic to 
create similar market conditions in Europe. Professional service companies also took the lead 
in the formulation of possible avenues to promote enhanced private litigation in the EU. A 
comparative study conducted by Ashurst – a transnational law company specialized in EC 
competition law provided the intellectual basis for the Green Paper, which apart from a 
detailed account on the possibilities for damage actions in the EU covered a wide range of 
other litigation-related measures, such as the introduction of class actions (cf. Waelbroeck et 
al. 2004).  
 
While the business community in Europe is expected to keep watch over itself and its 
competitors by seeking counselling support of professional law companies, the Commission 
has embarked on its own agenda as the next section will illustrate. 
  
The Stakes of the European Commission 
 
The political ideas and the steadfast commitment of the DG Competition were an essential 
driving force of the reform. The Commission’s agenda comes to the fore through the 
decentralisation of antitrust enforcement, which implies that new also NCAs and courts have 
to apply Article 81 and 82 for cases with a Community-dimension, something that previously 
was the exclusive prerogative of the Commission. Although it initially may sound 
counterintituive, the decentralisation was deliberately shaped to expand the DG Competition’s 
status quo of antitrust competences. Following Wilks (2004) the reform is exemplary of an 
‘audacious coup’ by the Commission to ‘extend its powers and to marginalize national 
competition laws’ or, what George Orwell in his seminal book 1984 expressed with 
‘decentralization is centralization’ (Wilks 2004: 12). 
 
As a part of the decentralization endeavor the European Competition Network (ECN) was 
established to provide a forum for NCAs and courts to cooperate and warrant legal 
  
consistency when enforcing Article 81 and 82. As the nodal point within the ECN, the 
Commission reserved for itself far-reaching supervisory powers: the opening of every new 
case needs to be reported to the Commission and in the event of conflicting decisions the 
Commission can retrieve cases again (i.e. Article 11(6) and 16 of Regulation 1/2003). These 
provisions allude that there is only one reference point for the interpretation of EC antitrust 
law, namely that of the Commission. The ongoing discussions on the introducing facilitating 
legal features in a decentralized private enforcement regime leave the tentative conclusion 
that the harmonization of litigation systems may reach high on the Commission’s future 
agenda. Although inconsistency in the enforcement of EU antitrust law is likely to be the 
order of the day for the reasons outlined earlier, the ECN as a mode of governance to cope 
with decentralization needs to be understood as an attempt at diluting the significance of the 
diverse national competition laws and practices in the long run. Thereby the project of an 
‘ever-closer Union’ intruded into a policy domain in which a harmonization never was 
politically feasible due to the strong resistance of the Member States to give up one of the last 
bastions of national market intervention (cf. Pollack 1998; Nugent et al. 2001). In the light of 
the tolerant stance of the Commission with regard to the freedom to cooperate, a 
harmonization towards the EU antitrust model fully complies with the free movement 
interests of companies and capital.  
  
However, rather than making itself obsolete, the Commission hopes to refocus its staff 
resources on cracking down cartels more vigorously on a global level (eventually it can 
impose fines that amount to ten per cent of a company’s annual turnover) and leave smaller 
cases to private trustbusters and national jurisdictions. The incentive to patrol the globe for 
hard-core cartels needs to be placed in the context of a range of prominent price-fixing cases 
in the late 1990s that marked a ‘golden age’ of US cartel prosecution, which resulted in 
highest fines ever and the imprisonment of CEOs (Litan and Shapiro 2001: 27). In the 
absence of a ‘world competition authority’, the Commission tries to expand its powers beyond 
the borders of the EU and fight transnational cartels in duopoly with the US agencies. The 
impetus goes further than the prestige- and competence-seeking of a regulatory body that long 
suffered from the image of being the junior partner of the US agencies. Instead, the antitrust 
reform was announced to convey ‘a world class regulatory system’ (European Commission, 
2002), which forms part of expediting and fostering the broader European project of 
neoliberal market integration that takes places against the background of the reinvigorated 
discourse surrounding the Lisbon Agenda of 2000 (on the latter see Van Apeldoorn and Horn 
  
in this volume). The aim to make the EU ‘the most dynamic knowledge-based and 
competitive economy by 2010’, in other words, to economically outperform the US and the 
rest of the world, is according to the dominant neoliberal view best achieved by downsizing 
Brussels’ ‘regulatory jungle’. With the privatisation and decentralisation of important aspects 
of EU antitrust enforcement, the reform seems no longer deviant from the prevailing tenet.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper demonstrated that the 2004 reform exposes antitrust law enforcement to market 
mechanisms and introduces a more microeconomic reasoning in the assessment of 
anticompetitive conduct. With the abolition of the administrative public control model and the 
concomitant decentralization of Article 81 and 82, the primacy of enforcement has shifted to 
the proactivity of private parties who are expected to bring observed antitrust breaches to the 
national courts. Private enforcement together with the institutional anchoring of enhanced 
microeconomics narrows the scope of antitrust enforcement to short-term efficiency criteria 
and price indicators, which can be construed as a considerable step of regulatory convergence 
towards the Anglo--Saxon style of organizing private market conduct, and the erosion of what 
has commonly been termed the Rhenish model of a coordinated market economy (on the 
latter see also in particular Nölke and Perry in this volume).  
 
The new regime produces a whole range of cross-purposes. In the absence of significant 
political opposition, private antitrust enforcement is likely to be further strengthened by 
subsequent reform steps as the 2005 Green Paper indicates. The costs of suing may be 
unaffordable for certain potential plaintiffs, in particular SMEs, employees, consumers, or 
more diffuse interests of society at large, which has as a consequence that the new regime is 
likely to be predisposed towards those who can afford ‘sound’ economic analyses and are 
willing to take the effort of suing. Shareholder interest groups, most notably large institutional 
investors or hedge funds with a strong interest in short-term payoff rather than long-term 
profitability, constitute one category of actors that is likely to profit from the new antitrust 
litigation possibilities. Although their agency cannot be derived from the actual reform in a 
minutely detailed way – their presence is merely confined to lobbying efforts regarding the 
introduction of criminal sanctions and class action litigation – and even though there is no 
transparent common agenda of shareholders to identify – the paper maintains that the EU 
  
antitrust reform opens up a window of opportunity for powerful shareholder interests to gain 
more corporate control. Antitrust litigation may serve as a means to alter the power 
constellation of the internal corporate governance structure, in particular to influence the 
business strategies of the management or the ouster of underperforming board members, as 
well as to facilitate predatory take-overs. Thereby the antitrust reform parallels in many ways 
the regulatory reforms of corporate governance regulation in Europe designed to strengthen 
the position of shareholders vis-à-vis the management, as well as other corporate 
stakeholders. 
 
The political forces that dominated the reform process - the DG Competition and its wider 
epistemic community of private practioners from the professional services sector - are also 
expected to benefit from the new regime, albeit for different reasons. The heightened demand 
for antitrust counselling and litigation services resulting from the retrenchment of a public 
authority provides intermediary law companies with a lucrative business. The Commission, in 
contrast, embodies a broader agenda of enhanced neoliberal market integration, which reflects 
the view of ‘less regulation is better regulation’ and market-based solutions are superior to the 
interventionist arm of a public authority. The involvement of private market actors as 
complementary controlling instances of the competitive process has been intended as an 
encouragement to tougher competition, which is believed to feed back on overall economic 
welfare and the goals defined in the Lisbon Agenda. Furthermore, those subject to antitrust 
control, the transnational business community, have a strong stake in legal certainty and a 
high degree of economic freedom, which implies uniform laws and practices in a common 
market. However, whereas the increased emphasis on microeconomic instruments in the 
assessment of anticompetitive conduct can work to their advantage, the increased private 
litigation activity at the expense of the secure notification procedure poses severe risks; in the 
worst case the advent of a claimants culture similar to that of the US with significant 
consequences regarding the distribution of corporate wealth.  
                                                  
NOTES 
1
 The term ‘antitrust policy’ is generally used among US practioners and academics, whereas 
in Europe the generic analogue ‘competition policy’ is more widespread. Here, the term 
‘antitrust’ is used to specifically refer to the fight against cartels and restrictive business 
practices.  
2
 The requirement to notify the Commission excluded SMEs anticipating an inter-firm 
agreement as their actions were considered of minor importance to trade and competition 
within the Internal Market.  
3
 Whereas the overall influence of German ordoliberal scholars in other economic regulatory 
policies has waned since the 1960s, it continued to have a remarkable stronghold in EU 
competition policy (cf. Budzinski 2003; Hölscher and Stephan 2004). Officials of German 
origin and trained in German competition law have traditionally held strategic positions in the 
DG Competition (cf. Hooghe and Nugent 2002).  
4
 The Commission repeatedly emphasized that ‘[…] [it] takes a favourable view of aid to 
small and medium-sized enterprises, given their structural handicaps as compared with large 
undertakings and their potential for innovation, job creation and growth.’ (European 
Commission 1996a: 34)  
5
 The following preconditions need to be fulfilled: ‘the agreement must lead to an 
improvement in the production or the distribution of goods, or the promotion of technical or 
economic progress; it must allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit; restrictions 
should be indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; and the agreement must not 
afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question’. These rather elastic notions are further clarified by lengthy 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
guidelines issued by the Commission (see for more: Communication of the Commission, 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2000/C291/01, JOCE n° C 291/1, 13/10/2000).  
6
 The high level of private enforcement in the US is also due to the fact that all cases of 
infringements with US antitrust law have to be prosecuted in the courts, including those 
initiated by US authorities. However, as this is a timely and costly procedure, more than 80 
per cent of the US government cases are either abandoned, or modified through voluntary 
settlements prior to involving the courts (Venit and Kolasky 2000). 
7
 The artificial situation of perfect competition is taken as a benchmark and the premises 
underpinning methodological individualism extrapolated to company boards: rationally 
behaving managers are assumed to generate economies of scale and scope in order to achieve 
efficiency gains and to maximize profits. Once efficiency gains are achieved, marginal 
production costs are expected to decrease, and - due to the competitive environment in which 
rival companies offer similar products - passed on to consumers. 
8
 For example, Mr. Muris, Chairman of the FTC since 2001 had already served under Reagan 
in the early 1980s where he became famous for his laissez-faire view according to which, not 
corporations, but governments were considered a threat to competition. He particularly 
displayed the Chicagoan attitude in the lax enforcement of the Microsoft monopolization case 
(Tomand and Lister 2001) 
9
 Elsewhere Monti concluded: “[i]t is fair to say that the far-reaching policy shift which 
occurred in US antitrust enforcement during the 1980s - namely, the shift towards a focus on 
the economic welfare of consumers - has been mirrored in the policy priorities of the 
European Commission during the 1990's.” (Monti 2004c) The heightened emphasis on 
consumers is attested by the creation of a post within the Commission's DG Competition 
called ‘Consumer Liaison Officer’ in December 2003. The task ascribed to this new 
institution is to ensure a permanent dialogue with European consumers and alert consumer 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
groups to competition cases ‘where their input might be useful’ (European Commission 
2003b). 
10
 Mr. Justice Ferris, an English judge specialized in antitrust law expressed his concerns as 
follows: ‘[Judges] cannot make value judgments, except in a very limited field, certainly not 
in relation to general economic questions […]. The Court should not have any part to play 
[…] in deciding whether an agreement or course of conduct contributes to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or promoting technical or economic progress […] I cannot 
see any court as we know it making a satisfactory job of that task.’ (cited in Forwood 2003: 
2). 
11
 The divergent rulings in 2001 on the GE-Honeywell merger fuelled the controversies. 
According to Charles James, former Assistant General of the US DoJ, the contradictory 
rulings are due to a ‘fundamental, doctrinal disagreement over the economic purposes and 
scope of antitrust enforcement’ (James 2001).  
12
 Compare the observations made by Nölke and Perry (this volume) on the growing role of 
Anglo--Saxon credit-rating agencies and accounting firms in Europe. 
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